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INTRODUCTION 
This is an appeal of an Qrck . Dismissal w itli Pi eji idice piii suant tc • R i l k 12(b)(6) 
Pendant University of Utah filed a motion to dismiss 
Plaintiff and Appellant, James Webb's ("Webb"), claims against it for Webb's failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the University of Utah's 
motion. Subsequently, the trial com i i muni an unin nil IIIMMIV ilnl iIn irnuimm'pirliri 
based on tl le j oint stipi llation of the remaining parties. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court * - 'Sjuiisiliclion in Ihis niafln imisimnl I 11 All ('ODb ANN. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR R E V I E W 
Does a IINIMMIII1 \\\ \ i ill m i sliicluih ilm fxcnisc reasonable care when 
providing educational instruction to its students? 
The trial court's Order of Dismissal may be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty 
that Webb would not be entitled to relief undei aiijv M/I <>l l<ul . ulin;h \ uuld hi phhi i n 
s .. • r - ^s v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). The issue is reviewed 
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's ruling. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,195 (Utah 1991). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the 
1 
Court shall "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Prows v. 
State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). 
Plaintiff preserved this issue in the trial court in his opposition brief and during the 
oral argument hearing on this matter. See Records Index 35-38 (Memorandum in Opposition 
to University of Utah's Motion to Dismiss) and 164-167 (Copy of Transcript of Motion to 
Dismiss Hearing Held 1/24/00), for preservation of this issue in the trial court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Addendum, Exhibit D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1998, Webb attended a class field trip as a student of the Defendant and Appellee, 
University of Utah. During the field trip, the University of Utah instructed Webb to travel 
upon icy and snow covered ground. Webb was injured when he slipped and fell on the ice 
and snow covering the ground upon which the University of Utah instructed Webb to walk. 
Webb filed a lawsuit against the University of Utah, alleging that the University of Utah was 
negligent in directing Webb, its student, to participate in a dangerous class activity. 
The University of Utah filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that it owed no duty of care to its students. On 
2 
January 31,2000, the trial court entered the Order granting the University of Utah's Motion 
to Dismiss. On November 13, 2002, the trial court entered an Order dismissing the 
remaining defendant named in the lawsuit. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Webb was a student of the University of Utah. See Complaint, f^ 6; Records 
Index 2. 
2. Webb was injured while participating in a university-mandated and supervised 
class activity. See Complaint, ffl[ 7, and 9; Records Index 2. 
3. Webb alleged that the University of Utah was negligent for instructing him to 
travel into a dangerous area. See Complaint, f^ 12; Records Index 2. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The University of Utah owes a duty to its students under fundamental principles of 
tort law to exercise reasonable care in performing services on behalf of its students. 
"Contractual relationships for the performance of services impose on each of the contracting 
parties a general duty of due care toward the other." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 
433,435 (Utah 1983). 
It is clearly established that one who undertakes to act. . . thereby becomes 
obligated to act with reasonable care. . . . There is no reason why a 
university may act without regard to the consequences of its actions while 
every other legal entity is charged with acting as a reasonably prudent 
person would in like or similar circumstances. 
Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 So.2d 86, 89-90 (Fla. 2000) (emphasis added). 
Webb contracted with the University of Utah for the performance of a service - to 
obtain educational instruction. Under fundamental principles of tort law, the University 
owed a duty to Webb to act as a reasonably prudent person when it undertook the act of 
providing educational instruction to Webb. 
Webb satisfied Utah's liberal notice pleading requirement to state a claim for which 
relief can be granted by alleging in his complaint that the University of Utah was negligent 
for instructing him to participate in a dangerous activity. 
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ARGUMENT 
The University of Utah argued, and the trial court agreed, that, as a matter of law, the 
University of Utah owes no duty to exercise reasonable care while providing educational 
instruction to its students. However, the University of Utah owed a duty to Webb to exercise 
reasonable care while providing educational instruction to Webb under fundamental 
principles of tort law. 
"To establish negligence, a plaintiff must first establish a duty of care owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff.... The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law 
to be determined by the court." Ferree v. Utah, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that the existence of a contractual relationship 
for the performance of services imposes on each of the contracting parties a general duty of 
due care toward the other. See DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433,435 (Utah 1983). 
The Supreme Court recognized that "a party who breaches his duty of due care toward 
another may be found liable to the other in tort, even where the relationship giving rise to 
such a duty originates in a contract between parties." Id. (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (holding that "a wrongful act committed in the course of a 
contractual relationship may afford both tort and contractual relief.")). 
The Supreme Court explained that "a majority of jurisdictions, like Utah, have 
recognized a duty to exercise reasonable care on the part of one who undertakes to render 
services." Id. at 436. To support its position, the Supreme Court noted that the Restatement 
5 
(Second) of Torts and Prosser are in accord. Id. The Supreme Court quoted the following 
passage set forth by Prosser: 
It is no longer in dispute that one who renders services to another is under a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in doing so, and that he is liable for any 
negligence to anyone who may foreseeably be expected to be injured as a 
result. 
Id (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 104 (4th ed. 1971)). 
Therefore, under Utah law, the University of Utah owed a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to Webb when rendering services to Webb. 
Unlike cases where a university was found not to owe a duty to students who are 
injured while participating in after-class activities and who based their claims against a 
university for failing to babysit them after class,1 many cases exist which establish that a 
]The Utah Supreme Court has held that college administrators no longer "assume[] 
a role in loco parentis." Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986) 
(holding that university did not have duty to supervise student after class was over). 
Thus, an educational institution is not required to "babysit each student" when the student 
is not in class. Id. However, this case presents a factual situation entirely distinct from 
Beach because Webb's injuries are alleged to be directly caused from the negligent 
instruction he received while in class as opposed to the injuries which were caused by the 
self-created dangers and events which occurred after class in Beach. 
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university owes a duty to students who are injured while participating in class activities and 
receiving contracted-for educational instruction. 
For example, in Delbridge v. Maricopa County Community College Dist. 893 P.2d 
55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), a student at a community college was injured while, at his 
instructor's direction, climbing a utility pole during a class exercise without a safety strap. 
The court in Delbridge noted that 
[s]chool districts, administrators, and teachers have a legal obligation for the 
benefit of the students enrolled in their classes. This obligation includes a 
duty not to subject those students, through acts, omissions, or school policy, 
to a foreseeable and unreasonable harm. 
Id at 58 (emphasis added). 
The community college argued that it did not owe a duty to its students, citing in 
support of its position Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). The court, 
however, distinguished Beach from the case it was reviewing. It noted that 
the issue here, however, concerns a school district's duty to provide safe in-
class environment for its students Even if we accept the fact that the class 
was held off-campus, [the student] was injured nonetheless while performing 
an exercise which was both supervised by the instructor and included in the 
curriculum. Therefore, the custodial supervision and in loco parentis cases 
cited by [the community college] do not govern this appeal. 
By contrast, courts in a number of other jurisdictions have imposed liability on 
colleges and universities for injuries suffered by students while attending 
classes. E.g. Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 
1941) (university liable to student injured in chemistry lab); LaVoie v. New 
York. 91 A.D.2d 749,458 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1982) (same); DeMaurov.Tsuculum 
College. Inc.. 603 S.W.2d 115 (Tenn. 1980) (university liable to student 
injured in physical education class); Amon v. New York. 68 A.D.2d 941,414 
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1979) (university liable to student cut by a table saw in the 
7 
university scenery shop); Grover v. San Mateo Junior College Dist. 146 
Cal.App.2d 86, 303 P.2d 602 (1956) (college liable to student injured during 
noncompulsory part of aeronautics course); Yarborough v. City University of 
New York. 137 Misc. 2d 282, 520 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Ct. CL 1987) (university 
liable to student injured in physical education class). 
Delbridge v. Maricopa County Community College Dist, 893 P.2d 55, 59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1995) (some emphasis in original and some added).2 
The Florida Supreme Court is in accord with those jurisdictions that have held that a 
state-owned university owes a duty to its students to exercise reasonable care in providing 
2Like the Arizona Court, Webb also found many other decisions in other 
jurisdictions in which courts held that a university owes a duty to a student who 
participates in school activities. E.g. Hores v. Sargent, 230 A.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996) (holding that university owed duty to take reasonable precautions for safety of 
students participating in school-organized bicycle trip); Kyriazis v. University of West 
Virginia, 450 S.E.2d 649 (holding that "University owes a duty of due care to its students 
when it encourages them to participate in any sport.'5); Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg 
College. 989 F.2d 1360 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding that university owes duty of care to 
student injured while participating in athletic event); Whittington v. Sowela Technical 
Inst., 438 So.2d 236 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that school owes duty to student injured 
while on nursing school field trip); and Kirchner v. Yale Univ.. 192 A.2d 641 (Conn. 
1963) (holding that university was obligated to exercise reasonable care to instruct and 
warn shop students in safe and proper operation of machines). 
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educational instruction to its students. The Florida Supreme Court recently rejected a 
university's argument that it did not owe a duty to its students merely because it does not 
stand in loco parentis with its students. See Nova Southeastern Univ.. Inc. v. Gross, 758 
So.2d 86,89 (Fla. 2000). The Court explained that just because a school does not owe a duty 
to assume a custodial role with a student does not mean that fundamental principles of tort 
law do not apply to the school. See id. The court noted that 
it is clearly established that one who undertakes to act, even when under no 
obligation to do so, thereby becomes obligated to act with reasonable care. . 
. . There is no reason why a university may act without regard to the 
consequences of its actions while every other legal entity is charged with 
acting as a reasonably prudent person would in like or similar 
circumstances. 
Id at 89-90 (emphasis added). 
In Nova, a case similar to this one, a student brought a claim against a university under 
a common law negligence theory based upon the university's assigning her to participate in 
a mandatory practicum at a dangerous location. The trial court dismissed the case because 
it determined that the university did not owe a duty to its student. The student appealed the 
decision to the Florida Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals distinguished cases that have held that schools do not "have a 
duty of supervision when the injuries have occurred off campus while students have been 
involved in non-school related activities." Gross v. Family Serv. Agency, Inc.. 716 So.2d 
337, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis in original). The court noted that in the case 
it was asked to review, the student was involved in a university-mandated activity at a 
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location specifically approved and suggested by the university. The court held that the 
university had a duty "to use ordinary care in providing educational services and programs 
to one of its adult students." Id 
In reviewing the appellate court decision, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the 
appellate court's analysis and held that a university owes a "duty to use reasonable care in 
assigning students to practicum locations." Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 
So.2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2000). 
Like the numerous colleges and universities referred to in the cases cited above, the 
University of Utah owed Webb a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person when it 
undertook the act of providing educational instruction to him. Webb alleged in his complaint 
that the University of Utah was negligent in assigning him to participate in a dangerous, 
university-mandated activity. Thus, Webb satisfied his obligation under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the 
University of Utah owed him a duty to exercise reasonable care while providing educational 
instruction to him. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Webb respectfully requests that the trial court's Order 
of Dismissal be reversed and that this case be remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
10 
Dated this J^_ day of / l l w , 2003. 
DRIGGS, BILLS & DAY, P.C. 
;£-
Brent Gordon 
Attorney for Appellant and Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Plaintiffs Complaint 
B. Transcript of Motion to Dismiss Hearing 
C. Order of Dismissal with Prejudice 
D. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12 
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Addendum "A" 
Kenneth A. Bills (#6835) 
DRIGGS, OSBORNE & HUANG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
331 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-9982 
Fax:(801)363-8370 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WEBB, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
The UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a division 
of the State of Utah, PARK PLAZA 
CONDOMINIUM OWNER'S 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, James Webb, by and through his undersigned counsel of record, complains and 
alleges against above named defendants as follows: 
1. Plaintiff James Webb is an individual and resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant University of Utah is a governmental entity of the State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Jonette Webster is an individual and resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Park Plaza Condominium Owner's Association is a non-profit 
corporation operating in the State of Utah. 
COMPLAINT 
Case Number: ^ O W f c # 9 
Judge: MgyiflenriixD 
5. Plaintiffs have complied with all procedural provisions of the Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
6. On or about March 7,1998, Plaintiff was a student in a class held by Defendant 
University of Utah. 
7. As part of the class, Defendant University of Utah had a scheduled "field trip" for 
the class that Plaintiff was enrolled in. 
8. The field trip was, in part, to examine various fault lines in the Salt Lake County 
area. 
9. As part of the field trip, the students were taken to property owned and under the 
control of Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums. 
10. The sidewalks under the control of Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums were 
covered with snow and ice. 
11. While standing on the sidewalk, Defendant Jonette Webster slipped on the ice, 
and while attempting to steady herself, caused Plaintiff to slip and fall on the concrete. 
12. Defendant University of Utah was negligent included, without limitation, failing 
to obtain permission of landowners before taking a class on a scheduled field trip, and taking the 
class into a dangerous area. 
13. Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums was negligent in failing to maintain a 
reasonable and safe condition on walkways under its control. 
14. Defendant Jonette Webster was negligent in failing to maintain her footing and 
falling, and in grabbing the Plaintiff as she slipped, causing Plaintiff to fall. 
15. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' negligence, the Plaintiff has 
sustained serious injuries to his body and shock and injuries to his system. All of said injuries 
have caused and continue to cause the Plaintiff great physical suffering and mental pain and 
suffering. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereupon alleges, that said injuries and 
said pain and suffering will be permanent and will result in permanent disability to the Plaintiff. 
16. As a further and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence of the Defendants, 
Plaintiff has been forced to incur medical bills for medical and hospital attention in an amount 
subject to proof at trial. 
17. Plaintiff has suffered special damages in a sum subject to proof at trial. 
18. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount incurred on special damages pursuant 
to the applicable statutes of the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff pray for judgment against the defendants as follows: 
1. For a determination by the Court that the defendants were responsible for the 
various injuries suffered by the Plaintiff. 
2. For a judgment against the defendants for special damages in a sum subject to 
proof at trial, as well as interest thereon. 
3. For general damages against the defendants in a sum subject to proof at trail. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this ^?day of August, 1999 
BY: DRIGGS, OSBORNE & HUANG 
Plaintiffs Address: 
1230 Roosevelt Ave 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Kenneth A. Bills 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Addendum "B" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WEBB, 
Plaintiff; 
v 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants, 
Case No. 990909689 PI 
Supreme Court No. 20000181-SC 
MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING HELD JANUARY 24, 2000 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
©fS)®V 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
652 Jefferson Cove 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
801-567-1157 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: KENNETH A. BILLS 
DRIGGS, OSBORNE & HUANG 
311 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
801-363-8370 
For the Defendant: SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
* * * 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 2000; 9:16 A.M. 
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, JUDGE PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Ready on Webb versus University, 
et al.? 
MS. STEINVOORT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Would you state your 
appearances for the record, please? 
MS. STEINVOORT: Sandra Steinvoort on behalf of 
the University of Utah, your Honor. 
MR. BILLS: Kenneth Bills on behalf of plaintiff 
James Webb, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I have read the memoranda 
that you have submitted and the affidavits. 
MS. STEINVOORT: Okay. 
THE COURT: Please go ahead. 
MS. STEINVOORT: Then I'll be a little bit more 
brief probably, your Honor, if you're familiar with the 
facts. Basically, this case arises out of an accident 
that occurred on — while Mr. Webb was a student at the 
University of Utah. 
THE COURT: He was on a field trip, and he's on 
property that doesn't belong to the University of Utah? 
MS. STEINVOORT: Correct. And the thrust of our 
argument is only that the University of Utah does not owe 
1 
a duty Mr. Webb because there is no existence of a special 
relationship. 
When the Court always tells me they've read 
stuff, then I get thrown off, because my argument kind of 
goes — 
THE COURT: Well, nobody ever believes me when I 
say something. That's why I have to throw out some of the 
facts. 
MS. STEINVOORT: Okay. Well, I've always 
believed it. 
But in this particular case, your Honor, I think 
there are cases, such as the Beach v. University of Utah, 
which has facts similar to this one in the sense that 
there is a student enrolled at the University of Utah on a 
field trip, goes on a lamb roast with her professor and 
her classmates, goes back to the campsite and is allowed 
to wander off, and falls off the side of the mountain and 
is a quadriplegic. 
In that particular case, the Supreme Court held 
that there was no special relationship, therefore no duty 
owed to the student. And what's unique, in suing the 
governmental agencies, is that you have to show that a 
duty is owed to that particular plaintiff individually, 
not at large, and you have to show that by demonstrating 
that there is an ability on the behalf of the University 
2 
of Utah to control the conduct of a third party* And in 
this case, we feel those facts aren't alleged and that 
there could not be a situation where those facts could be 
alleged, because no special relationship existed. 
Well, I feel like I'm curtailing myself, but 
does the Court have any specific — 
THE COURT: No. 
MS. STEINVOORT: - questions that you'd like me 
to go through, or... 
THE COURT: Maybe you could save the rest of 
your argument for your final argument. 
MS. STEINVOORT: Very well. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Bills. Tell me where you would draw the 
line, Mr. Bills, as far as the liability the university 
ought to extend in your case. 
MR. BILLS: Well, there is - I think you're 
right. There is a line. I'm not sure exactly where that 
line is. The question is whether or not the duty lies 
with the individuals. And again, given the procedural 
background of this case, where we're at a motion to 
dismiss before discovery has even commenced, they have to 
show that there is no set of facts that could come out 
that would bring rise to that special relationship. 
In this case, under threat of his grades being 
3 
reduced, he's instructed to trespass onto private, 
dangerous property. If that doesn't give rise to a 
special relationship between the school and the individual 
who's instructed to go upon that property, I can't think 
of a circumstance where the university would ever be 
negligent. 
Under their exception, it would swallow the 
entire governmental immunity law where the state waives 
governmental immunity. Under what circumstances would it 
be possible, given — with a motion to dismiss, to ever 
show that a special relationship existed? Perhaps the 
only circumstances I could think of would be medical 
malpractice cases with the University Hospital, but other 
than -that, it would be almost impossible, at this stage of 
a trial, to show no chance of there being a special 
relationship between the parties. 
THE COURT: Can you even give me a hypothetical 
that might exist where you believe there might be a 
special relationship? 
MR. BILLS: Sure. Under the circumstances that 
we believe happened in this case, where the instructor 
directs the students to travel onto dangerous property. 
It's different than the Beach case, where in that case — 
first of all, the Beach case was a summary judgment, and 
it wasn't all decided based on whether or not a special 
4 
duty existed. 
The court looked at four specific circumstances 
or theories of liability to the plaintiff. The first was 
the main one, which is their failure to supervise after 
the end of the lamb roast and when the plaintiff, on her 
own, wandered up onto the mountainside and got hurt. 
The next was whether or not the plaintiff and 
the defendant, the university, had properly instructed the 
plaintiff in camping, and the court held that even if 
there was a duty there that perhaps — that there was no 
evidence at that point of causation. 
Then they brought up an issue of the instructor 
drinking and whether or not that was negligent and a 
breach of the duty to that particular plaintiff. And the 
court held that in that case there was no showing of 
causation. 
And finally — and this is the one that maybe has 
the most bearing on this case — is whether or not the 
university allowing underage drinking was a breach of its 
special duty, and the court said that if the duty is 
incapable of performance or is fundamentally at odds with 
the nature of the parties' relationship, then we're loath 
to find a special duty. 
In this case, however, there is a special duty 
when the instructor is directing and controlling the 
5 
students and telling them to — and specifically placing 
the students in a dangerous position. It could well turn 
out, as discovery proceeds, that in fact one or more of 
the defendants wasn't negligent. In that case, then that 
will be the proper time for either me to dismiss it or for 
that defendant to bring a motion for summary judgment 
based on the facts that actually come out in the case. 
But at this stage of the game, to say the 
university, as a matter of law, cannot owe a special 
relationship to one of its students is premature. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bills. 
Ms. Steinvoort? 
MS. STEINVOORT: I can think of a situation 
where a governmental agency could have a special 
relationship, and those two would be the exceptions as 
outlined in Section 315 of the restatement, where a party 
can control the conduct of a third party. It might be, 
for example, in a prison situation where there may be 
notice that someone has some hostility toward a particular 
person, and you can protect and separate people. Or when 
the victim has a right to expect protection with such as 
in a protective order. If the sheriff's office is called 
to respond and there's a protective order, then that 
person has right to expect protection. 
But in this particular case, it was — the 
6 
1 question really should be, could the university have 
2 understood and appreciated that a student in the class 
3 would slip on ice and therefore pull down Mr. Webb, and 
4 those are the facts that comprise this lawsuit. It isn't 
5 that the university took them to a dangerous situation. 
6 It's the fact that one student slipped and pulled down her 
7 classmate. 
8 And in that situation, I don't think the 
9 university could assess and appreciate the potential 
10 threat of harm to Mr. Webb, and I also don't believe that 
11 the university could do anything to protect against it 
12 without circumscribing its own conduct, which is to — in a 
13 geology class, it takes students on a field trip. It's 
14 sort of an anticipated activity, to go and investigate, 
15 and it would change dramatically the way the teacher could 
16 teach that particular class. 
17 So on that, your Honor, we would submit it. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you, 
19 The motion is granted. The University of Utah 
20 is dismissed. 
21 MS. STEINVOORT: Thank you, your Honor, 
22 I (Proceedings concluded at 9:24 a.m.) 
23 
24 
25 
CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript 
in the before mentioned trial held before Judge Stephen 
L. Henriod was transcribed by me from a videotape and 
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed this 4th day of April, 2000 in 
Sandy, Utah. 
Carolyn Hrickson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2002 
f&g' *£% CAROLYN ERISKSQA 
P ^ f JSI
 K< ?"** UT 84070 W *" * W M * Common E * i yMF ««y commission Expres f
 May 4fht 2002 
STATE OF UTAH 
Addendum "C" 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT - 5352 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P. O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
Attorneys for Defendant University of Utah 
By. 
•LED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 3 j 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES WEBB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a division 
of the State of Utah, PARK PLAZA 
CONDOMINIUM OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non Profit 
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Case No. 990909689 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The defendant University of Utah's Motion to Dismiss came before the Court on 
Monday, January 24, 2000. The plaintiff was not present but was represented by counsel, 
Kenneth A. Bills. The defendant was represented by Sandra L. Steinvoort, Assistant Attorney 
General. 
The Court having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed the memoranda submitted 
by counsel and being fully advised on the matter, now and therefore, hereby ORDER, 
ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
1. That the motion to dismiss is granted and the plaintiffs claims against the 
defendant University of Utah are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this %( day of ( T L g ^ / f t * ^ 0 0 0 . 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DRIGGS OSBORNE & HUANG 
-KENNETH A. BILLS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
<frf>ZM&l 
STEPHEN L. HfiNRIOD 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/ 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this £ ' day of January, 2000, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
KENNETH A BILLS 
DRIGGS OSBORNE & HUANG 
331S600E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
TERRY M PLANT ESQ. 
PLANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
4 TRIAD CENTER STE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PARK PLAZA CONDOMINIUM OWNERS 
JOSEPH J JOYCE ESQ. 
STRONG AND HANNI 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE STE 600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT JONETTE WEBSTER 
fyUurfff*-^ 
Addendum "D" 
35 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
reason." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 
P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Award of attorney fees to landowners against 
adjacent landowners, on the basis that the 
adjacent landowners acted in bad faith by seek-
ing attorney fees from landowners after obtain-
ing a quitclaim deed from landowner for the 
disputed property, could not be supported un-
der either § 78-27-56(1) or this rule, because 
when adjacent landowners filed their claim 
there was there was no clear prohibition on the 
recovery of attorney fees in undisputed quiet 
title actions and finding was not made as to bad 
faith on part of the adjacent landowner. 
Chipman v. Miller, 934 R2d 1158 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
—Standard 
Sanctions were improper against an attor-
ney, where opposing parties conceded that no 
particular document was signed in violation of 
the rule, but simply argued that even if the 
attorney believed the case was well grounded 
when he filed the complaint, he should have 
known after he met with counsel for defendants 
that the case could not go forward. Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Utah appellate courts should use the three-
standard approach in reviewing a trial court's 
Rule 11 findings. This approach includes: (1) 
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact under 
the clearly erroneous standard; (2) reviewing 
the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule 
11 was violated and any subsidiary legal con-
clusions under the correction of error standard; 
and (3) reviewing the trial court's determina-
tion as to the type and amount of sanction to be 
imposed under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 
1992); Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
The determination of whether conduct vio-
lates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis. 
Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 R2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 R2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 199U; Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburger, 841 P2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); Astili v. Clark, 956 P2d 1081 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579. 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597. 
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues — 
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v. 
Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 877. 
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959. 
Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The 
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-and-
Think-Again" Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 879. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 339 to 349. 
C.J.S, — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366. 
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for 
client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th 
249. 
Inherent power of federal district court to 
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in ab-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789. 
Comment Note — General principles regard-
ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 
107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in action 
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96 
A.L.R. Fed. 13. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
for infliction of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R. 
Fed. 442. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in anti-
trust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573. 
Procedural requirements for imposition of 
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days 
after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise 
expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
.Within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
j^Ply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
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of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial 
on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after 
notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summ ary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point 
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted 
and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order 
or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the 
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, 
the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to 
him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all 
defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
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raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he 
does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made 
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination 
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross References. — Motions generally. 
Rule 12, F.R.C.P. U.R.CJP. 7. 
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